Abstract Pomaranch [3] is a synchronous stream cipher submitted to eSTREAM, the ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project. The cipher is constructed as a cascade clock control sequence generator, which is based on the notion of jump registers. In this paper we present an attack which exploits the cipher's initialization procedure to recover the 128-bit secret key. The attack requires around 2 65 computations. An improved version of the attack is also presented, with complexity 2 52 .
Introduction
Pomaranch 1 is one of the 34 stream ciphers submitted to eSTREAM, the ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project [1] . The cipher is implemented as a binary one clock pulse cascade clock control sequence generator, and uses 128-bit keys and IVs of length between 64 and 112 bits [3] . The construction is based on the notion of jump registers.
Jump controlled LFSRs were introduced in [2] as alternative to traditional clockcontrolled registers. In jump controlled LFSRs, the registers are able to move to a state that is more than one step ahead without having to step through all the intermediate states (thus the name jump registers). The main motivation for the proposal of jump registers is to construct LFSR-based ciphers that can be eciently protected against side-channel attacks while preserving the advantages of irregular clocking.
Outline of Pomaranch
Pomaranch is depicted in Figure 1 , where only the key stream generation phase is represented (called Key Stream Generation Mode). The cipher consists of nine cascaded jump registers R 1 to R 9 . The jump registers are implemented as autonomous Linear Finite State Machine (LFSM), built on 14 memory cells, which behave either 1 The cipher is also referred in the specication document [3] The 128-bit key K is divided into eight 16-bit subkeys k 1 to k 8 . At time t, the current state of the registers R t 1 to R t 8 are non linearly ltered, using a function that involves the corresponding subkey k i . These functions provide as output eight bits c t 1 to c t 8 , which are used to produce the jump control bits JC t 2 to JC t 9 controlling the registers R 2 to R 9 at time t, as following:
The jump control bit JC 1 of register R 1 is permanently set to zero. The key stream bit z t produced at time t is the XOR of nine bits r t 1 to r t 9 selected at xed positions of the current register states R t 1 to R t 9 .
Key and IV Loading. During the cipher initialization, the content of registers R 1 to R 9 are rst set to non-zero constant 14-bit values derived from π, then the subkeys k i are loaded and the registers are run for 128 steps in a special mode (called Shift Mode). The main dierence between the Key Stream Generation Mode and the Shift Mode is that, in the latter the output of the ltering function of register R i (denoted by c i ) is added to the feedback of register R i+1 , with the tap from cell 1 in the register R 9 being added to the register R 1 , making then what can be seen as a big loop. Note that the conguration of the jump registers do not change in this mode (they all operate as if JC i = 0). This process ensures that the states of the registers R 1 and R 9 after this key loading phase depend upon the entire key K. We denote these states by R K 1 to R K 9 .
Next the IV is loaded into the registers. The IV can have any arbitrary length between 64 and 112 bits. If the IV length is shorter than 112 bits, it is expanded by cyclically repeating it until a length of exactly 112 bits is obtained. This new string is then loaded into the registers as described below. In the remaining of this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the IV length is exactly 112 bits.
The IV is loaded into the registers in the following manner: the 112-bit IV is split into eight 14-bit parts IV 1 to IV 8 , which are XORed with the 14-bit states of . The key stream generation mode of Figure 1 is now activated, and the runup consists of 128 steps in which the produced key stream bits are discarded.
Description of the Attack
We have identied the following weakness in the Pomaranch IV initialization procedure: if for a given key K and IV value IV , we only modify the IV part IV 8 and keep the remaining parts IV 1 to IV 7 unchanged (thus obtaining a modied IV value IV ), on comparing the key stream generation under the key K with IV and IV , we have that for every t ≥ −128
In other words, the Key and IV loading procedure does not diuse all IV bits into the whole state of the generator. Consequently, if IV and IV are chosen as above, the contributions from registers R 1 to R 7 cancel out on each key stream XOR z t (IV ) ⊕ z t (IV ), and we obtain the relation
2 The Pomaranch specication does not mention this feature, which is described in the source code provided with the submission and has been conrmed by one of the designers [4] . We will show in the next section that, although the cipher can be attacked even if this feature is withdrawn, this represents an additional weakness that leads to improved attacks.
We now show how to exploit this weakness to recover the subkey k 8 of an unknown key K, in a chosen IV attack. Consider 3 distinct chosen IV values IV , IV and IV , which only dier by their part IV 8 , IV 8 and IV 8 . We can obtain the corresponding rst m-bit key stream z t (IV ) t=0 to m−1 , z t (IV ) t=0 to m−1 , and z t (IV ) t=0 to m−1 , which in turn provide the pairwise XOR values
In order to recover the value of k 8 , we guess the following values: -n 8 = {t ∈ {−128, .., −1} | JC t 8 (IV ) = 1}: 129 possible values; -n 9 = {t ∈ {−128, .., −1} | JC t 9 (IV ) = 1}: 129 possible values; -n 9 = {t ∈ {−128, .., −1} | JC t 9 (IV ) = 1}: 129 possible values; -n 9 = {t ∈ {−128, .., −1} | JC t 9 (IV ) = 1}: 129 possible values.
The attack exploits the jump registers property that since the transition matrices
A and A + I commute, the transition matrix associated with a number s of steps can only take one of the at most s + 1 values A p (A + I) q , with p + q = s. Due to this property, the knowledge of the values of (n 8 , n 9 , n 9 , n 9 ) is sucient to derive the R 8 and R 9 transition matrices of the form A 128−n (A + I) n associated with the 128-step runup for IV values IV , IV and IV . Note that although n 8 , n 9 , n 9 , n 9 can take any of 
Indeed, for a certain (k 8 , R K 8 , R K 9 , n 8 , n 9 , n 9 , n 9 ) assumption and a choice of JC t 8 (IV ), the pair (δ t , δ t ) can take one of four possible values. Assuming the values are randomly generated, there are three events to consider. First the case in which the pairs (δ t , δ t ) for both the choices of JC t 8 (IV ) = 0 and JC t 8 (IV ) = 1 are in agreement with the observed value. Its probability is 1/16, and it leaves us with two possible congurations that need to be further tested. The second event is when only one pair (δ t , δ t ) for either the choices of JC t 8 (IV ) = 0 or JC t 8 (IV ) = 1 is in agreement with the observed one. Its probability is 3/8, and it leaves us with one possible conguration that need to be further tested. The third event is when neither the pairs (δ t , δ t ) for the choices of JC t 8 (IV ) = 0 and JC t 8 (IV ) = 1 is in agreement with the observed one (i.e. the conguration is inconsistent). Its probability is 9/16, and no further tests using this conguration is necessary. Thus if X denotes the number of tests we need to perform, then
and E(X) = 2.
The attack described above allows us to recover the value of k 8 . Its complexity is bounded over by 2 16 × 2 28 × (2 5 ) 4 × 2 = 2 65 . Note that the attack also recovers the correct values for R K 8 and R K 9 . To recover the other key parts, we can proceed as following: repeat the same attack for another value of (IV, IV , IV ), call it (IV , IV , IV ), such that IV and IV only dier by their part IV 7 and IV 7 . Since we know already k 8 , R K 8 and R K 9 , this second attack can be mounted much faster.
Finally, we can guess the values of R K 7 and n 7 and check whether there exists a sequence JC t 7 (IV ) t=0 to m−1 that is consistent with the already known sequences JC t 8 (IV ) t=0 to m−1 and JC t 8 (IV ) t=0 to m−1 . This can be done for all the remaining key parts, until the entire key K has been recover. The complexity of the entire attack remains about 2 65 . Improved Attack. Note that so far we have not exploited the non-zero state forcing feature of Pomaranch, and the above attack works whether this feature is present or not. We now show that this feature results in a low complexity distinguisher, and also allows us to reduce the complexity of the key derivation procedure described above.
The distinguisher works as following: given an unknown key K, we can try the 2 14 possible IV values obtained by keeping (say) IV 1 to IV 7 unchanged and taking all possible values for (say) IV 8 . Now two of these 2 14 IVs result in exactly the same states R −128 1 to R −128 9 after key and IV loading, namely the IV value resulting on a 14-bit R 8 state equal to zero (which will have one bit switched to 1 by the cipher non-zero state forcing procedure), and the IV value derived from the former one by swapping the same bit position. The key streams for these two IV values are exactly the same. If the key stream is sucient long (e.g. more than 27 bits in order for collisions of a pair of IV values to be unlikely), this provides an ecient chosen IV distinguisher of distinguishing probability close to 1, requiring generation of only 2 14 key stream sequences of length (say) 64 bits each.
This distinguisher can be used to improve the key derivation attack described above. Indeed, the distinguisher allows us to recover the register value R K 8 up to one single bit, so that a factor of 2 13 can be saved in the search of (k 8 , R K 8 , R K 9 , n 8 , n 9 ,n 9 , n 9 ), and the attack complexity is reduced to 2 52 .
Conclusion
We showed in this paper how to mount a chosen IV attack to recover the secret key of Pomaranch with complexity much lower than the one expected with 128-bit keys. The attack exploits a weakness in the cipher initialization procedure, namely the process does not diuse all the IV bits into the whole state of the key stream generator. By exploiting another feature of the IV loading, we were able to substantially improve the attack.
